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Abstract Pieter Lemmens’ neo-Marxist approach to technology urges us to rethink how
to do political philosophy of technology. First, Lemmens’ high level of abstraction raises
the question of how empirically informed a political theory of technology needs to be.
Second, his dialectical focus on a ‘‘struggle’’ between humans and technologies reveals the
limits of neo-Marxism. Political philosophy of technology needs to return ‘‘to the things
themselves’’. The political significance of technologies cannot be reduced to its origins in
systems of production or social organization, but requires study at the micro-level, where
technologies help to shape engagement, interaction, power, and social awareness.
Keywords Neo-Marxism  Political philosophy of technology  Postphenomenology 
Empirical philosophy
1 Introduction
How to do political theory of technology? This is the main question that arises from Pieter
Lemmens’ erudite and at the same time rather gloomy political analysis of information
technology. At a high level of abstraction, Lemmens offers us a tour along several neo-
Marxist approaches to technology and our economic system, in order to conclude that we
urgently need to regain our ‘social autonomy’. The question remains, though, if this
analysis lays bare all dimensions of the political significance of information technologies.
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Digital technologies, according to Lemmens—or at least according to the authors he
cites; the difference is not always clear—create a new proletariat, which can be called a
‘cognitariat’. They control both production processes and consumption processes, and
rather than liberating people they enslave them. The central effect of this ‘machinic
enslavement’ is that digital technologies do not only affect our individual lives by creating
distraction and mass consumption, but also our ‘social autonomy’: our capacity to act as a
society. And in doing so, they weaken our capacities of resistance. The only answer to this
is to ‘‘adapt’’ technologies ‘‘to what we collectively decide to be a life worth living’’ and to
‘‘adopt’’ technologies ‘‘as weapons for reconquering our collective autonomy in the light of
an increasingly totalitarian capitalism’’.
Lemmens’ approach raises two fundamental questions as to how to do political phi-
losophy of technology. First of all, the question arises to what extent a political theory of
technology needs to base itself on empirical research of technology. For that reason, I will
discuss Lemmens’ approach in relation to the so-called ‘empirical turn’ in philosophy of
technology. Second, the question arises what the limitations of a neo-Marxist perspective
on technology are. Alternative frameworks reveal other forms of political significance of
information technologies, and result in alternative conclusions.
2 Political Philosophy and the Empirical Turn
Lemmens’ analysis of information technology seems to leave us with two alternatives:
enslavement versus reconquering autonomy. ‘‘Digital technologies’’ affect our self-con-
sciousness and our social consciousness, which undermines our collective agency and
social autonomy, and which asks for subversive action to turn the tide. In a certain way,
this approach resembles the classical analyses in philosophy of technology, which also
tended to focus on the potentially alienating role of technology, and which conceptualized
‘Technology’ as a broad social and cultural phenomenon, rather than investigating actual
technologies. Along comparably abstract and gloomy lines, Lemmens makes firm claims
about ‘‘fixed capital residing in the nervous systems of living labor’’, ‘‘the increasing
integration of the human mind into the digital circuits of capital’’, and the ‘‘discrepancy
between cyberspace’’ and ‘‘cybertime’’, which ‘‘induces all kinds of psychopathologies’’
and ‘‘erodes the subject’s sensibility and affectivity due to the constant pressure to adapt
one’s psychic apparatus to the codes and rhythms of the network.’’ Technology is taken as
a broad category, and its impact is seen as essentially negative.
The ‘empirical turn’ in philosophy of technology (Achterhuis 2001) aimed to provide a
more nuanced alternative to the overly abstract and generalizing character of classical
approaches. Philosophical abstraction, it holds, should be linked to the study of actual
technologies and technological developments, in order to ensure an engaged, well-in-
formed and relevant analysis. Rather than speaking about technologies as manifestations of
some underlying principle, philosophy of technology should investigate the implications of
concrete technologies for philosophical themes like knowledge, morality, and politics.
Lemmens’ approach is deep and rich, but it is certainly not empirical. He interprets the
work of other authors, most notably the work of Bernard Stiegler, and integrates these
approaches into a political theory of technology. Rather than constructing a philosophical
framework in close relation to actual information technologies, he builds upon psycho-
analytic and Marxist frameworks that were developed way before information technologies
came into being. To be sure, this does not make these frameworks useless. But such an
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analysis at least requires an explicit problematization of the very possibility to speak in
these terms about information technologies.
The ‘empirical turn’ has brought a sensitivity for philosophical issues ‘from within’
rather than ‘from outside’ technologies. To what extent do concepts like ‘‘organic nervous
systems of the cognitariat’’ and ‘‘libidinal energies’’ help to clarify the role of actual
information technologies in society? And could there also be other impacts than the ‘‘de-
autonomization’’ that is so central in the neo-Marxist frameworks discussed? Reversing the
perspective, by starting from actual technologies rather than pre-given philosophical
frameworks, may reveal a much more nuanced picture. Even though there certainly is a
growing dependence on large companies like Microsoft, Apple and Google, and on their
products, which have a profound influence on our daily lives, these very technologies can
also be the source of new forms of social agency and self-awareness.
It cannot be denied that new information technologies challenge our attention, our
concentration, our independence, and our creativity. But at the same time there is a
growing awareness of these impacts, which makes people increasingly deal with them in a
critical and creative way. Moreover, these new information technologies are themselves
also the source of new forms of political awareness, as the so-called ‘‘Facebook revolu-
tions’’ in Iran, Egypt, and Tunisia have shown, as well as the Tahrir square protests in
Turkey. Instead of a libidinal inferno of consumption and distraction, information tech-
nologies played a much more productive role in these situations. Even though there are
good reasons not to overestimate the actual foundational role of social media in these
protests (cf. Morozov 2011), it cannot be denied that information technologies also open up
new political spaces, rather than merely closing them down. And this can be acknowledged
only when actually investigating the subtle ways in which technologies help to shape
political engagement, action, and community. Instead of applying a pre-given framework
to a technology, we need to let technologies be a challenge to these frameworks.
This is not to say that philosophical notions like Stiegler’s concept of the ‘‘pharmakon’’
could not play a significant role in political philosophy of technology—to the contrary. But
in order to be meaningful, such concepts need to be thought through, redefined, and
sharpened in relation to actual technological developments. Without a micro-level analysis,
the macro-level runs the risk of getting detached from what it aims to clarify.
3 Marxism and Beyond
This need for an approach ‘from within’ also has implications for the role of (neo-
)Marxism in political philosophy of technology. Ever since its first beginnings, Marxism
has played a central role in philosophy of technology. There are even good reasons to see
Karl Marx himself as one of the first philosophers of technology, laying bare how tech-
nological means of production have profound social impacts. It is especially Andrew
Feenberg who has taken up this Marxist legacy and elaborated it into a sophisticated
political theory of technology that makes it possible to analyze phenomena of techno-
logical instrumentalization, critical appropriation, and the democratization of design, in
close dialogue with the empirical field of Science and Technology Studies.
All of these Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches have a dialectical character. They
think in terms of struggle: oppression and resistance, enslavement and liberation, dis-
traction and self-consciousness. Stiegler’s approach to human-technology relations, which
plays a central role in Lemmens’ analysis, gives this dialectics a fascinating new turn. For
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him, the struggle between humanity and technology is constitutive for the human being.
Our ‘‘originary technicity’’ makes technology part of the human condition, and for that
reason it is a ‘‘pharmakon’’: poison and medication at the same time. Curing our innate
defect—the fact that human beings are born as deficient beings who have to augment
themselves with technologies—implies that we have to poison ourselves in order to live.
This is a very sophisticated dialectical model, which is not simply a dialectics of
oppression and liberation, but an unavoidable struggle to live with technology. For that
reason, it is a bit disappointing that Lemmens concludes his analysis with the thesis that we
need to appropriate technologies as ‘‘weapons (…) for (re-)conquering our collective
autonomy in the face of an increasingly totalitarian capitalism bent on controlling subjects
(…).’’ In such a diagnosis, information technologies are mere vehicles of capitalism, and
dialectics is a mere fight for autonomy. This seems to ignore the hermeneutical orientation in
the dialectic frameworks of Feenberg and Stiegler, in which technologies are constitutive for
human beings. A call to take up arms against the technologies of capitalism reinstates a
separation of human beings and technologies that goes against the most central insights in
philosophy of technology and Science and Technology Studies of the past decades.
4 Realism
Political philosophy of technology, therefore, is in need of realism. A realism in the
phenomenological sense of going back ‘‘to the things themselves’’. Technologies are not
opposed to politics; they are its very media. The political significance of technologies
cannot be reduced to its origins in specific systems of production or social organization.
Technologies mediate politics: they help to shape political engagement, interactions,
frameworks, power relations, self-consciousness and social awareness. And for this reason,
doing political theory of technology requires close analyses of the technological things
themselves, and a realistic recognition of the technological condition of human existence.
Not as weapons to fight with, but as the ecostructure in which we inevitably live our lives.
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